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COMMENTS 
PROPERTY-] OINT BANK AccoUNTS-THE DoNEE's INTER 
V1vos INTEREST-The use of joint bank accounts has become wide-
spread throughout the United States in recent years and has been 
the source of considerable litigation and comment.1 The predom-
inant importance of this type of account is that it allows funds 
remaining at the death of a co-depositor to pass to the survivor 
without the necessity of a will. This aspect of the account, caus-
ing it to be known sometimes as a "Poor Man's Will,"2 has been 
the focal point of the attention given to the transaction; and 
today, after more than half a century of uneven treatment by the 
courts, all jurisdictions will uphold this survivorship feature. The 
majority of our courts give effect to the survivorship feature on 
the ground that the co-depositors had joint interests in the ac-
count during their lives. In two leading articles,3 however, Pro-
fessor Kepner has urged that the joint account be regarded as a 
new type of valid testamentary disposition which should be upheld 
on its own merits, and not under the guise of traditional theories 
of joint ownership. Kepner states that in actuality our courts do 
not give both parties valid interests during their lives despite the 
joint tenancy language employed, and that the donee's interest is, 
as in a will, nothing more than an expectancy while the donor is 
still alive.4 It appears, however, that the question of the donee's 
interests during the lives of the co-depositors is far from settled. 
The classic situation from which all the problems arise is gener-
ally as follows: Depositor A opens a bank account and signs a de-
posit card stating that the funds are to be payable to either A or B, 
balance to the survivor. The deposit card further states that this 
account is to be held by the co-depositors as joint tenants and not 
as tenants in common, and that both shall have the right to make 
1 See Jones, The Use of Joint Bank Accounts as a Substitute for Testamentary Dis-
position of Property, 17 U. Prrr. L. R.Ev. 42 (1955); Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship 
Bank Account-a Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 596 (1953); Kepner, 
Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 376 (1959) and 
articles cited therein at 404. 
2 In re Edward's Estate, 140 Ore. 431, 436, 14 P.2d 274 (1932), was one of the 
earliest decisions in which this phrase was used. 
3 Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-a Concept Without a Name, 
41 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1953); Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account 
Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 376 (1959). 
4 Id. at 396, 403. 
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withdrawals.5 Assuming that the money belonged solely to A 
prior to the deposit, A may thus be designated the "donor" and B 
the "donee" in the transaction. Inter vivos disputes between A 
and B may thereafter arise under any one or more of the follow-
ing circumstances: (I) A cancels the account and substitutes C as 
a co-depositor, or orders the account to be held in A's name alone;6 
(2) A withdraws more than half of the funds for his own use; 7 
(3) B withdraws some of the funds for his own use; 8 (4) a creditor 
of A or B levies on the account;9 (5) either A or B becomes in-
competent and a guardian attempts to withdraw some of the 
funds.10 Any of these situations may necessitate a declaration by 
a court of the legal interests of the parties. 
I. BASIC SOURCES OF DIFFICULTY 
It might be expected that the courts would have some diffi-
culty delineating the precise interests of the parties since the 
deposit agreement itself obviously does not spell them out with 
particularity. The major problem, however, has not been one of 
delineating the extent of the donee's interests, but rather one of 
deciding whether the donee has any interests in the account at 
all. Typically, B-asserts that the form of the account should raise 
a conclusive presumption that he does have inter vivos interests 
in the account, while A maintains that the form is meaningless, 
or at most evidentiary, in this regard. As the law stands today 
there is virtually total confusion regarding these inter vivos in-
terests as to the requirements for their creation, their relation to 
5 Some cases draw a distinction between accounts held in the names of "A or B, or 
the Survivor" or similar language which does not further explain the ownership rights or 
right to withdraw, and those accounts which recite the joint tenancy and right to with-
draw in the agreements themselves. In states that draw this distinction, the former type 
of account may be held to be unsuccessful to pass either survivorship or inter vivos rights 
to the donee. See Berdar's Estate, 404 Pa. 93, 170 A.2d 861 (1961); Greener v. Greener, 
ll6 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949). 
6 Medeiros v. Cotta, 134 Cal. App. 2d 452, 286 P.2d 546 (1955); Zander v. Holly, I 
Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d 87 (1957). 
7 Paterson v. Comastri, 39 Cal. 2d 66, 244 P .2d 902 (1952); Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 
Hawaii 455 (1958). 
8 Landman v. Landman, 136 A.2d 392 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957); Gaucher v. 
Planeta, 338 Mass. 121, 153 N.E.2d 895 (1958). 
o Tinsley v. Bauer, 125 Cal. App. 2d 724, 271 P .2d ll6 (1954); Leaf v. McGowan, 13 
Ill. App. 2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957). 
10 Howard v. Imes, 265 Ala. 298, 90 So. 2d 818 (1956); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Savallisch, 364 Mich. 168, IIO N.W.2d 724 (1961). 
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the survivorship feature of the account, and the very nature of 
the interests themselves. 
Underlying the confusing status of the donee's interests are 
four somewhat interrelated sources of difficulty: (a) inconsistency 
in the willingness of the courts to draw inferences concerning the 
donor's intent from the form of the account alone; (b) the unsatis-
factory results which flow from use of traditional joint tenancy 
law; (c) variance in theoretical approach by different courts; and 
(d) the effect of the status relationships of the parties. 
Unfortunately, the courts do not recognize and deal with these 
factors as underlying problems, but typically decide each case 
by emphasizing one factor or another and ignoring the rest. 
Regardless of the particular factual setting, the ultimate issue of 
whether the court will recognize any inter vivos interest whatso-
ever in the donee seems to depend primarily upon a particular 
court's general outlook and the factors that it chooses to stress in 
deciding the case. The result is that there is no semblance of uni-
formity or clarity in the decisions so that no conclusion which 
could be considered satisfactory may be drawn from the cases 
which have made determinations on these inter vivos cases. 
A. Form and Intent: Judicial Inconsistency and the 
Survivorship Cases 
Normally, when one executes a document which affects his 
legal interests, it can be presumed, in the absence of fraud, mis-
take or incapacity, that the document is the best evidence of that 
person's intent. In joint account situations, however, the written 
deposit agreement may not be a valid indication of intent for two 
reasons. First, the terms themselves cannot be said to spell out 
any specific intent with any particularity. This same form of 
account has been held to have been employed by depositors with 
the different intents of giving to the donee: (a) survivorship rights 
and rights to appropriate funds from the account while the donor 
is living;11 (b) survivorship rights only;12 and (c) a power of with-
drawal only, as an agent of the donor, with no inter vivos or 
survivorship rights.13 
11 Kranjcec v. Belinak, 114 Mont. 26, 132 P.2d 150 (1942). 
12 In re Estate of Voegeli, 108 Ohio App. 371, 161 N.E.2d 778 (1959). 
13 Landman v. Landman, 136 A.2d 392 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957); Estate of 
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Secondly, many courts think it highly probable that the donor 
really did not intend to pass any inter vivos interests in the account 
despite the fact that he has employed the joint account form. To 
understand this it is necessary to understand the relationship be-
tween the survivorship and inter vivos decisions. In the survivor-
ship cases the courts have been primarily concerned with the re-
quirements of the statutes of wills. Traditionally, transactions 
which transferred interests in property from one person to another 
solely on the occasion of the donor's death were held to be void 
if not executed in accordance with the wills statutes. Thus, bank 
deposits held in the name of "A, payable at death to B" have uni-
formly been held to be ineffectual to pass any interest at all to 
B.14 All jurisdictions in the United States, however, have seen fit 
to allow funds to pass to the donee-survivor if the account is in 
the name of "A or B, or the survivor." The reason stated by the 
courts, generally, is that the donee had a "present interest" in the 
latter type of account during the donor's lifetime, and thus did 
not receive the funds solely because of the donor's death.15 The 
"present interest" is the distinguishing factor which has permitted 
the survivorship feature of the account to survive the challenge of 
the statute of wills. 
When inter vivos disputes occur, therefore, the courts are 
faced with a dilemma. If they deny that the donee has a present 
interest in the account which he may assert against the donor, 
they will be denying the validity of the rationale by which they 
uphold the survivorship feature of the account. On the other 
hand, if they uphold the donee's "present interest" against the 
donor, they fear that they may be enforcing an inter vivos trans-
fer that the donor did not really intend to make. The courts feel 
that the donor may have intended, and probably did intend, to 
give the donee only a survivorship interest based upon other con-
siderations. 
Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 127 N.E.2d 445 (1955); Gaucher v. Planeta, 338 Mass. 121, 153 
N.E.2d 895 (1958); Administrator v. Meyers, 48 Ohio App. 131, 192 N.E. 540 (1934). 
14 See, e.g., Young v. McCoy, 152 Neb. 138, 40 N.W.2d 540 (1950); Tucker v. Simrow, 
248 Wis. 143, 21 N.W.2d 252 (1946). 
15 See Ball v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 N.E.2d 898 (1943); Cleveland Trust v. Scobie, 
114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926); Beach v. Holland, 172 Ore. 396, 142 P.2d 990 
(1943). 
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B. Problems in the Use of Joint Tenancy Concepts 
Although a joint tenancy interest may be considered a single 
interest in property, it is made up of two separate and distinct 
parts: (I) the right to ownership, enjoyment and control of the 
property while both tenants are alive, and (2) the right of the 
survivor to take the property at the death of his joint tenant. In 
the usual joint tenancy setting there is little need to distinguish 
these interests carefully, and they are often treated as one. Thus, 
if donor A were to make a gift of a joint tenancy interest in cer-
tain property to B, it might be said that A had the single inten-
tion of transferring the one composite interest; his one intention 
would be presumed to encompass both component parts. 
In the joint bank account situation, however, as seen before, 
this simple logical inference may not hold true. A particular 
donor-depositor may utilize the joint account form in order to 
take advantage of the survivorship aspect of the account without 
intending to transfer any inter vivos rights in the funds to the 
donee. An analysis of this transaction in joint tenancy terms alone 
clearly would not be capable of giving effect to this intent. If 
our traditional concepts of joint tenancy are carried to their log-
ical conclusion, the donee could not take a joint tenant's interest 
when the donor did not intend to give him either the one com-
posite interest or the two component parts. Since most courts hold 
under their common law that the survivorship aspect of the ac-
count cannot stand by itself because of the statute of wills require-
ments, but must be supported by an underlying joint tenancy in 
order to be given effect, the intent to pa~s an inter vivos interest 
is extremely important in survivorship cases. 
It is this basic point that serves as the analytical stumbling 
block in joint account litigation. Many courts treat both survivor-
ship and inter vivos questions as opposite sides of the same coin, 
and decide both types of cases by determining the one question of 
whether or not an actual joint tenancy was created at the time the 
account was opened. Their conclusions in both survivorship and 
inter vivos cases are then drawn from that one consideration. An 
equivalent number of jurisdictions, however, do not follow 
through with the joint tenancy analysis. Whether with or without 
authority of statute, these jurisdictions depart from the common 
law of joint tenancy and uphold the survivorship interest without 
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necessarily upholding the concomitant "present interest" of the 
donee. In survivorship cases, either a strong or an irrebuttable 
presumption is invoked from the form of the deposit in favor of 
the donee, while in the inter vivos cas~s the evidentiary weight 
given to the form of the deposit may vary in different jurisdictions, 
but the end result is that outside evidence of the donor's intent is 
uniformly admitted and the donee must carry the burden of prov-
ing that the donor did intend to make a gift of present enjoyment 
of the funds. Furthermore, the inquiry in these cases is not whether 
the donee received a total joint tenancy interest with its resulting 
dual attributes, but whether the donor intended to transfer only 
the one interest in question in each type of case. There is no in-
vestigation in survivorship cases as to whether or not the _donor in-
tended to give the donee a right to present enjoyment, and there 
is similarly no inquiry in the inter vivos cases as to the survivor-
ship interest. 
C. The Use of Differing Theories 
The search for the donee's interest is further complicated by 
the fact that the courts do not approach the problem uniformly. 
Each jurisdiction analyzes the question according to its own blend 
of the common-law theories which it deems applicable, as modi-
fied by the statute enacted in that particular state to deal with 
the problem. A brief explanation of the theories and statutes will 
be attempted here, with the pertinent points discussed in more 
detail where applicable in later portions of the text. 
I. Common Law Theories of Transfer: Gift and Contract 
There are two16 main theories employed by the courts to de-
scribe the means by which an interest in the account is said to 
be transferred from the donor to the donee-gift and contract. 
The courts which employ the gift theory analogize the joint ac- _ 
count transaction to a traditional property law gift. The common-
law requirements of delivery and relinquishment of control over 
the property are not demanded, however, since these requirements 
would be inconsistent with joint ownership of the funds in the 
16 A third theory, trust, has been employed by the Maryland courts. The recent 
case of Jones v. Hamilton, 211 Md. 371, 127 A.2d 519 (1956), however, states at 380, "If 
the mechanics are adequate to effectuate the intent, the court will gratify the intent 
whether or not the trust form has been used." 
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account. The question of the donor's intent thus becomes the 
prime consideration under the gift theory, and the problem facing 
the court is whether the opening of the account in joint form is 
sufficient evidence on this question. Most cases decided on this 
theory hold that the form alone is insufficient for this purpose17 
although some hold to the contrary.18 
Under the contract theory, the donee acquires his interests 
through the medium of the written deposit agreement. Early 
cases regarded the contract as one between the depositors them-
selves,19 but the more recent theory is that the contract is between 
the donor and the bank with the donee as a third-party benefi-
ciary.20 
1/ 
- Important problems are posed under the contract theory. Most 
courts which employ it hold that the contract is merely the method 
,:·-' of transferring a joint interest to the donee, and regard the con-
tract as merely a substitution for delivery to validate what is es-
\ sentially a gift transaction.21 At least one jurisdiction, however, 
~Ii.olds that the contract is not merely the means of acquiring a 
property interest through gift, but is the source of a purely con-
tractual right against the bank.22 Such a contract right would not 
necessarily have any of the attributes of the property rights which 
are included under the heading "joint tenancy." 
A second problem that arises under the contract theory is the 
possibility that the parol evidence rule may be asserted by the 
donee to preclude the search for evidence outside of the written 
deposit agreement.23 Most courts which employ the contract 
17 Some courts hold that the form of the account will be sufficient in the absence 
of any evidence to the contrary, but that the form alone will be insufficient if rebutting 
evidence is introduced. Compare Adams v. Jones, 258 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) 
with Ottjes v. Littlejohn, 285 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). Other courts hold, under 
the gift theory, that the form alone will not suffice even in the absence of contrary 
evidence. See Imirie v. Imirie, 246 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Chase's Estate, 82 Idaho 1, 
348 P.2d 743 (1960). 
18 Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955) (unclear whether gift theory or 
contract theory is used); Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949). 
19 See In re Estate of Voegeli, 108 Ohio App. 371, 161 N.E.2d 778 (1960); Barbour v. 
First Citizens Nat'l Bank, 77 S.D. 106, 86 N.W.2d 526 (1957). 
20 In re Estate of Voegeli, supra note 19; Barbour v. First Citizens Nat'I Bank, supra 
note 19. 
21 See Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-a Concept Without a 
Name, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 596, 604 (1953). 
22 In re Estate of Voegeli, 108 Ohio App. 371, 161 N.E.2d 778 (1960). 
23 See Harvey's Estate v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955); McManis 
v. Keokuk Sav. Bank & Trust, 239 Iowa 1105, 33 N.W .2d 410 (1948); Bums v. Nemo, 
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theory do not invoke the rule in inter vivos disputes, but some do, 
with a telling effect on the results in these jurisdictions.24 
In many jurisdictions the contract theory analysis breaks down 
when applied to inter vivos cases. The courts do not attempt to 
construe the written agreement as a contract, but simply declare 
that the transaction is based on contract and announce that the 
realities of ownership may be shown by evidence of the donor's 
intent outside of the instrument25 despite the terms of the agree-
ment. 
2. Statutory Modifications: Bank Protection, Joint Tenancy, 
and Special Statutes 
All states except Kentucky have enacted statutes dealing with 
joint accounts.26 These may be divided into three types: bank 
105 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1960); Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W.2d 
817 (1950); Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); Stanger v. Epler, 
382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955). See also Close, Joint Bank Accounts in Ohio, 11 W. 
R.Es. L. REv. 511, 519 (1960); Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 569 (1954). 
24 The use of the parol evidence rule has been the primary means by which courts 
have given the donee strong presumptions of an inter vivos interest. The two jurisdictions 
that give the donee more than a rebuttable presumption in inter vivos cases, Pennsylvania 
and Utah, do so by employing the rule. See Stanger v. Epler, supra note 23; Greener v. 
Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P .2d 194 (1949). 
25 See Fecteau v. Cleveland Trust Co., 171 Ohio St. 121, 124, 167 N.E.2d 890 (1960); 
Campagna v. Campagna, 337 Mass. 599, 150 N.E.2d 699 (1958); Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis. 
2d 300, 84 N.W.2d 87 (1957). 
26 Bank protection statutes: Al.AsKA CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 34-1-27 (1949); Aroz. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 51-516 (Supp. 1952); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 5 § 923 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 26-201 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 653-16 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2039 (1933); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 26-1014 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. ANN. 
STAT. § 51-104 (1951); IOWA CODE § 528.64 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1205 (1949); 
LA. R.Ev. STAT. § 6.32 (1950); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 11, § 102 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 167, § 14 (1959); MINN. STAT. § 48.30 (1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5205 (1942); MONT. 
R.Ev. OoDE ANN.§ 5-528 (1947); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 8-167 (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-3 
(1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-66 (1959); OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. § 1105.09 (Baldwin 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1180 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT. 
§ 708.515 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-903 (Supp. 1961); Rl. GEN. LAws 
ANN. § 19-11-4 (1956); S.C. CODE § 8-171 (1952); S.D. CODE § 6.0414 (1939); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 45-412 (1955); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-710 (1959); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 7-3-45 (1953); VA. CoDE ANN. § 6-55.1 (1958); Wis. STAT. § 221.45 (1957); WYo. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-29 (1957). 
Joint tenancy statutes: ARK. STAT. § 67-521 (1947); CAL. FIN. CoDE § 852; CoLO. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-13-6 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws § 178:91 (1955); MICH. COMP. LAws 
§ 554.43 (1948); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. § 362.470 (1949); NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 663.010 (1960); N.Y. 
BANKING LAW §§ 134(3), 171(3), 239(3); WASH. REv. CODE § 30.20.015 (1952); W. VA. 
CODE ch. 31, art. 8, § 3205 (1961). 
Special statutes: ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 128(2a) (Supp. 1949); OoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. 
§ 36.3 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 19-G V.(B) (Supp. 1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 384-28 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.9A-218B (Supp. 1958); VT. STAT. tit. 8, § 809 (1958). 
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protection, joint tenancy, and special. The bank protection type 
of statute, enacted in thirty-four jurisdictions,27 states generally 
that the bank is authorized to pay the funds in the account to 
either of the two named co-depositors during their lives and to 
the survivor, without the bank thereby incurring liability to either 
party. All but two28 of these statutes have been interpreted as 
not affecting the property interests in the funds as between the 
co-depositors, but as merely protecting the bank from liability. 
These states, therefore, must rely on their common-law theories 
in analyzing the joint account transaction; the bank protection 
type of statute offers no assistance. 
The joint tenancy type of statute has been enacted in ten 
jurisdictions.29 Generally, it provides that an account opened 
according to the statutory form will create a joint tenancy with the 
funds payable to the survivor. Giving the statutory words their 
plain meaning, these statutes would appear to decide the issue of 
the co-depositor's interests, and all joint tenancy statute jurisdic-
tions do hold that there is a presumption of joint tenancy 
in the donee's favor in both survivorship and inter vivos cases. 
The presumption is of limited practical benefit to the donee in 
inter vivos disputes, however, since all but two of the states place 
the ultimate burden of persuasion on the donee and allow outside 
evidence of the donor's intent to be controlling.30 Despite the 
27 See statutes cited note 26 supra. 
28 The Idaho and Nebraska courts have interpreted their statutes as creating a 
joint tenancy in the account if the statutory requirements are met. Gray v. Gray, 78 
Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650 (1956); Slocum v. Bohuslov, 164 Neb. 156, 82 N.W.2d 39 (1957). 
One other state, Mississippi, has interpreted its statute as providing for a right of 
survivorship. This interpretation does not necessarily affect the inter vivos rights of the 
co-depositors, but provides only for a strong presumption that the funds will pass to the 
survivor. In re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 480, 13 So. 2d 20 (1943); Leverette v. Ainsworth, 
199 Miss. 652, 23 So. 2d 798 (1945). 
29 See statutes cited note 26 supra. 
so Paterson v. Comastri, 39 Cal. 2d 66, 244 P.2d 902 (1952); Comastri v. Burke, 137 
Cal. App. 2d 430, 290 P .2d 663 (1955); Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Hawaii 455 (1958); Marrow 
v. Moskowitz, 255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460 (1931); Munson v. Haye, 29 Wash. 2d 733, 189 
P .2d 464 (1948). The Missouri courts apparently give the donee strong presumptions in 
both survivorship and inter vivos cases, but do so in reliance on the contract theory and 
parol evidence rule, however, not the joint tenancy statute. Commerce Trust Co. v. 
Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W.2d 817 (1950); Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. 
App. -1954). Michigan, on the other hand, gives the donee a rebuttable presumption in 
both inter vivos and survivorship cases under its joint tenancy statute, and appears to 
place the ultimate burden of persuasion on the donor in both types of cases. Jacques 
v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958) (dictum as to inter vivos rule). Arkansas 
does not give effect to the joint tenancy language of its statute, but treats it as though 
it were a bank protection type of statute. Park v. McClemens, 231 Ark. 983, 334 S.W .2d 
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statutory language that the co-depositors hold as joint tenants, 
therefore, the majority of the joint tenancy statute jurisdictions 
arrive at much the same result in inter vivos cases as do the major-
ity of courts which must apply common-law theories. The basic 
question remains the donor's intent, and outside evidence on this 
question is readily admissible. -
Special statutes have been enacted in six states.31 They differ / 
from the other two types of statutes in that they specifically recog-
nize the joint account as a method of transfer of funds to the sur-
viving co-depositor. None of these statutes, however, makes any 
mention of the co-depositors' inter vivos interests.32 Thus, al-
though the survivorship question is settled in these jurisdictions, 
the question of the donee's inter vivos interests is not answered, 
and the courts must once again look to their common law. 
Although it might appear from a reading of individual tases 
that the result in each case is determined according to the theory 
and statute employed, an examination of the cases as a whole 
indicates that, with some exceptions, the particular theories and 
statutes actually have little or no bearing in determining the na-
ture and extent of the donee's interests. The gift and contract 
theories are useful in that they supply the rationale by which 
joint accounts may be held to transfer any interest at all to the 
donee. With few exceptions, however, they do not have any bear-
ing in determining the nature or extent of that interest. The use 
of a particular statute or theory does not compel or even indicate,... 
the holding that a court will reach in a given case. Those courts 
that have given the donee a strong presumption of a present in-
terest in inter vivos cases have done so under all combinations of 
statutes and theories. As an illustration, Utah with a bank protec-
tion statute and gift theory, Iowa and Pennsylvania with bank 
709 (1960). Colorado, Nevada, and West Virginia have not had sufficient litigation in 
this area to allow for conclusions. 
Sl See statutes cited note 26 supra. 
s2 As illustrative of the special statutes, the Maine statute, ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. 
ch. 59, § 19-G V.(A-B) (Supp. 1961), reads: "A. When a deposit has been made or shall 
hereafter be made in any bank, savings bank or trust company ••• in the names of 2 or 
more persons, payable to either, or payable to either or the survivor, such deposit, or 
any part thereof, or the interest or dividends thereon may be paid to any or either of 
said persons .••• B ..• [and] shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, upon 
the death of any of such persons, become the sole and absolute property of the survivor 
or survivors, even though the intention of all or any one of the parties be in whole, or 
in part, testamentary and though a technical joint tenancy be not in law or fact created." 
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protection statutes and contract theories, and Missouri with a joint 
tenancy statute, all arrive at a strong presumption33 in the donee's 
favor.34 Similarly, those courts which employ weak presumptions 
or none at all in inter vivos cases, and demand that the form of 
the account give way to outside proof of the donor's intent, also 
do so under all types of statutes and theories.35 Thus, it is clear 
that the policies underlying the inter vivos decisions cannot be 
identified by reference to the statutes and theories employed but 
must be based upon other considerations. 
D. The Status of the Parties May Control the Decision36 
As long as the inter vivos disputes are between the donor and 
donee themselves, those courts which employ weak presumptions 
in these cases treat the joint account form as having a relatively 
minor significance in determining the parties' interests. The 
33 Although the presumptions in favor of the donee's interests are categorized as 
either "strong" or "weak" in this comment, the tests actually employed by the courts 
in a given case do not fall into such neat categories. At the extremes are the cases in 
which a court invokes an irrebuttable presumption in the donee's favor in absence of fraud, 
duress, or undue influence or holds that the form of the account is completely meaningless 
even as evidence for the donee. Most cases, however, do not employ such extreme tests, and 
many require considerable study and interpretation before it can be determined just 
exactly how much weight is being accorded to the joint account form in determining the 
donor's intent. For the purpose of establishing an arbitrary standard by which the cases 
may be classified, therefore, "strong" presumptions will be considered to be those which 
establish at least a prima facie case for the donee, and which can be overcome only by 
"clear, precise, and convincing" or "indubitable" evidence by the donor or those claiming 
in his behalf. "Weak" presumptions will be those where the donee must offer additional 
evidence of the donor's intent over and above the form of the account, and must sustain 
the burden of proof on this issue. 
84 Bums v. Nemo, 105 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1960) (applies to inter vivos interest by 
implication); Williams v. Williams, 251 Iowa 260, 100 N.W.2d 185 (1959) (applies to 
inter vivos interest by implication); Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 
S.W.2d 817 (1950) (dictum as to inter vivas interest); Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d 541 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (dictum); Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955); Greener 
v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P .2d 194 (1949). 
35 Von Tungeln v. Chapman, 343 S.W.2d 782 (Ark. 1961) Goint tenancy statute); 
Imirie v. Imirie, 246 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (bank protection statute and gift theory); 
Miller v. Higgins, 188 Kan. 736, 366 P.2d 257 (1961) (bank protection statute and contract 
theory); King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955) (bank protection statute-
theory unclear). 
36 Disputes with guardians of one of the co-depositors as a party have not been given 
special treatment in this comment. The primary significance of the guardian cases is that 
those courts which give the donee a weak presumption will nevertheless not allow the 
donor's guardian to make withdrawals that are not necessary for the donor's support. 
Howard v. Imes, 265 Ala. 298, 90 So. 2d 818 (1956); Abrams v. Nickel, 50 Ohio App. 500, 
198 N.E. 887 (1936); Coolidge v. Brown, 286 Mass. 504, 190 N.E. 723 (1934); First Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Savallisch, 364 Mich. 168, 110 N.W.2d 724 (1961); Boehmer v. Boehmer, 
264 Wis. 15, 58 N.W.2d 411 (1953). 
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donee has little equity in his favor, having given no considera-
tion for the interest he now claims and basing his demand solely 
on the largesse of the donor. In these circumstances, the donor is 
granted a great deal of leeway in challenging and defeating the 
donee's claims. 
1. Creditors 
When creditors enter the picture, however, these same courts 
are less willing to allow the donor to disaffirm the donee's interests 
to the detriment of creditors who may not know of any particular 
relationships or agreements between the co-depositors, and who 
may have extended credit on the faith of the donee's apparent in-
terest in the account. Thus, courts that. would ordinarily deny to 
the donee any presumption of an inter vivos interest or would 
invoke only a weak presumption do just the opposite in creditor 
situations.37 The donee is presumed to have a joint interest in the 
account, and the burden of proof is placed upon the party con-
testing the donee's interest.38 
Those courts which invoke a strong inter vivos presumption 
for the donee in the first instance need not change their presump-
tion to accomplish the same result. The creditor, in both weak 
and strong presumption jurisdictions, can thus rely on the form 
of the account to raise a presumption that the donee does have 
an interest that is subject to attachment, and the co-depositors 
must sustain the burden of proving the donor's contrary intent 
in order to rebut the presumption. 
2. Husband and Wife 
In at least five states,39 the fact that the co-depositors are hus-
band and wife may result in a holding that a tenancy by the en-
37 Tinsley v. Bauer, 125 Cal. App. 2d 724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954); Leaf v. McGowan, 13 
Ill. App. 2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957); R.H. White Co. v. Lees, 267 Mass. 112, 166 N.E. 
705 (1929); Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951); Sitomer 
v. North River Sav. Bank, 194 Misc. 870, 95 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949). For decisions 
of states that employ strong presumptions for the donee, see Staton v. Vernon, 209 Iowa 
1123, 229 N.W. 763 (1930); Esposito v. Palovick, 29 N.J. Super. 3, 101 A.2d 568 (1953); 
Norcross v. 1016 Fifth Ave. Co., 123 N.J. Eq. 94, 196 Atl. 446 (1938); American Oil Co. 
v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939); Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 
P.2d 327 (1941). 
38 See cases cited note 37 supra. 
39 In re Griffith, 33 Del. Ch. 387, 93 A.2d 920 (1953); Hoyle v. Hoyle, 31 Del. Ch. 64, 
66 A.2d 130 (1949); Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956); Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 
So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951); Feltz v. Pavlik, 257 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. 1953); Alcorn v. Alcorn, 364 
Pa. 375, 72 A.2d 96 (1950); Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 Atl. 172 (1934); 
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tireties has been created. Once this decision has been reached, 
the interests of both donor and donee can be determined with 
certainty in accordance with applicable common-law principles 
governing ownership by entireties. The survivorship interest will 
be granted in all cases,4° and both parties will be held to have 
inter vivos interests in the account. 
In accordance with traditional theory, the use that may be 
made of the funds in the account while both are alive will be 
severely limited. Neither party will be able to withdraw any por-
tion of the funds for his own use, nor will creditors of either party 
be able to reach the account to satisfy a debt owed by only one 
of them.41 Withdrawals are allowed only if the money is spent 
for the joint benefit of both spouses.42 Any funds that are with-
drawn and not used for this purpose will be considered as still 
held by the entireties,43 as will any property purchased with those 
funds.44 Withdrawal for the use of only one party may be consid-
ered as an invitation to sever, however, and the tenancy may be 
destroyed if the other party acquiesces, each party then becoming 
a tenant in common of one half of the deposit.45 
Despite the agreement among jurisdictions as to the effect of 
finding that the account is held as an estate by the entireties, 
there are three separate approaches employed by different juris-
dictions with regard to the requirements which must be met 
before a tenancy by the entireties can be said to arise. The Ten-
nessee court uses identical legal theories for both non-spouse and 
husband-and-wife accounts. The intent of the parties is said to 
control the result in both sitµations,46 and a contract theory is 
Madden v. Gosztonyi Sav. &: Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 Atl. 624 (1938); Sloan v. Jones, 
192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W.2d 506 (1951). 
40 See, e.g., In re Griffith, supra note 39; Madden v. Gosztonyi Sav. &: Trust Co., 
supra note 39. 
41 See, e.g., Alcorn v. Alcorn, 364 Pa. 375, 72 A.2d 96 (1950); Bostrom v. National 
Bank, 330 Pa. 65, 198 Atl. 644 (1938); Madden v. Gosztonyi Sav. &: Trust Co., 331 Pa. 
476, 200 Atl. 624 (1938). 
42 See In re Griffith, 33 Del. Ch. 387, 93 A.2d 920 (1953); Hoyle v. Hoyle, 31 Del. Ch. 
64, 66 A.2d 130 (1949); Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1959); Feltz v. Pavlik, 257 
S.W.2d 214 (Mo. 1953); Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 Atl. 172 (1934); Madden v. 
Gosztonyi Sav. &: Trust Co., supra note 41; Alcorn v. Alcorn, supra note 41. 
43 See cases cited note 42 supra. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 Atl. 172 (1934). 
46 See Melhorn v. Melhorn, 208 Tenn. 678, 348 S.W.2d 319 (1961); Sloan v. Jones, 
192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W .2d 506 (1950). 
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used to support both transactions.47 Thus, the same considera-
tions which would give rise to a joint tenancy between non-
spouses will be held to give rise to a tenancy by the entireties 
when the parties are husband and wife. 
The Florida court, on the other hand, draws a definite distinc-
tion between entireties and joint tenancy situations. The court is 
extremely reluctant to find that the account is held by the entire-
ties, and will do so only upon conclusive evidence of an intent 
to hold by the entireties as opposed to joint tenancy. One Florida 
case has gone so far as to hold that a tenancy by the entireties was 
not created between a husband and wife even though it was clear 
that both parties intended the account to be constituted a joint 
and survivorship account.48 Furthermore, the Florida court holds 
that an account in the name of husband "or" wife is not sufficient 
to give rise to any form of joint account at all.49 
The Pennsylvania court employs a third approach. The hus-
band and wife cases are treated as separate from the non-spouse 
joint account cases, as in Florida, but instead of being more diffi-
cult to attain, they are readily found to exist. Any deposit by a 
husband or wife in both of their names will be presumed to give 
rise to a tenancy by the entireties.50 There is no specific require-
ment as to the wording of the account, and an account in the 
name of husband "or" wife will be considered as sufficient.51 
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania court does not find it necessary 
to deal with the account in terms of the joint account theories 
which it applies in non-spouse cases. The account is considered 
as just one form of a normal common-law tenancy by the entireties 
of personal or real property, with all of the ramifications of that 
type of interest.112 
47 Melhorn v. Melhorn, supra note 46; People's Banlc v. Baxter, 41 Tenn. App. 710, 
298 S.W.2d 732 (1956); Sloan v. Jones, supra note 46. 
48 Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956); see Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 
(Fla. 1951). 
49 In re Estate of Lyons, 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1956). 
fiO Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 Atl. 172 (1934); Bostrom v. National Bank, 
330 Pa. 65, 198 Atl. 644 (1938); Madden v. Gosztonyi Sav. &: Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 
Atl. 624 (1938). 
111 Alcorn v. Alcorn, 364 Pa. 375, 72 A.2d 96 (1950). 
112 See cases cited notes 50, 51 supra. 
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IL THE JUMBLED p ATIERN OF DECISIONS 
Underlying the entire joint account problem are two funda-
mental questions: should a court allow a donor to utilize a joint 
bank account to pass only a survivorship interest to the donee? 
And, if so, can such a result be attained under existing law? Ju-
dicial answers to these questions have not been uniform. Of the 
fifty-one jurisdictions in the United States (including the District 
of Columbia), only twenty-nine53 have had sufficient litigation in 
this area to permit meaningful statements regarding the status of 
their law. Of these twenty-nine, about half answer the first ques-
tion in the affirmative, and about half in the negative, the latter 
fifteen jurisdictions54 applying traditional joint tenancy law in 
both survivorship and inter vivos cases. The fourteen55 jurisdic-
tions that answer the first question in the affirmative, apply pre-
sumptions of differing strengths in the two types of cases. Of these 
fourteen, however, ten56 have answered the second question in the 
negative, and have found it necessary to enact statutes to provide 
for the departure from the common law. Only four57 jurisdictions 
answer both questions in the affirmative, and employ differing 
presumptions in the two types of cases without specific statutory 
authorization. 
A. Adherence to Joint Tenancy Concepts 
The fifteen jurisdictions which answer the initial question in 
the negative make the one issue in both types of cases the question 
of the donor's intent to transfer a joint interest equal to his own 
to the donee. Since the joint tenancy interest is considered to be 
a single, albeit composite, interest in property, the same tests and 
presumptions are applied by these courts regardless of which as-
53 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. These jurisdictions 
will each be discussed infra. 
54 Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia. 
55 Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. 
56 Special statutes: Alabama, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Vermont. Joint tenancy statutes: California, Hawaii, New York, Washington. See note 26 
supra for citations. 
57 Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, Wisconsin. 
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pect of the joint account is in question. The presumption drawn 
from the form of the account is thus either uniformly weak or 
uniformly strong in these jurisdictions, seven58 of the fifteen states 
employing strong presumptions, while the remaining eight59 in-
voke presumptions that are weak if present at all. 
The result in these jurisdictions is that the courts that have 
chosen to establish a high degree of certainty in survivorship situ-
ations, by establishing a strong presumption from the form of 
the account, feel that they must also employ this same strong pre-
sumption against the donor in inter vivas cases. The account, 
thus, instead of resembling a will, which may be changed by the 
donor at any time up to his death, becomes an irrevocably exe-
cuted property transfer. In the converse situation, if the court 
invokes uniformly weak presumptions, and bases its decisions on 
outside evidence of the donor's intent in survivorship as well as 
inter vivas cases, the transfer will remain open to attack even after 
the donor's death, and will give the donor little assurance that a 
final disposition has been made of his property. 
I. Uniformly Strong Presumptions for the Donee 
It may be said with certainty that in two states, Pennsylvania60 
and Utah,61 strong presumptions are invoked in the donee's favor 
in both survivorship and inter vivas cases. The rationale em-
ployed by the courts of both states is that the donor's intent con-
trols in both types of cases, but that, in the words of the Utah 
court: 
"[W]here ... the parties have entered into and expressed 
in writing a complete agreement which is clear as to the 
intent and purpose of the deposit, the intent so expressed 
will be given effect unless the instrument is successfully at-
tacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, or 
58 Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah. 
50 Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Texas, 
Virginia. 
oo In re Berdar's Estate, 404 Pa. 93, 170 A.2d 861 (1961): Furjanick Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 
100 A.2d 85 (1953); Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955). 
01 Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949); Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 
181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941) (creditor case). The Utah cases pose a problem in classification, 
for although strong presumptions are invoked in both types of cases, the presumption 
in inter vivas cases can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, while the pre-
sumption in survivorship cases is conclusive. Greener v. Greener, supra; Holt v. Bayles, 
85 Utah 364, 39 P.2d 715 (1934). 
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unless it is shown by 'clear and convincing proof' that the 
parties intended the instrument to have a different effect 
from that expressed."62 
Thus, although the form of the deposit alone, if in the name of 
"A or B, balance to the survivor," would apparently not suffice 
to show the donor's intent, the additional written agreement be-
tween the co-depositors serves to do so, even though this "agree-
ment" is merely part of the bank's deposit-card form on which the 
account was opened. 63 
Three more states, Missouri,64 Iowa,65 and Indiana,66 would 
appear, from the rationale of their survivorship cases, also to em-
ploy a uniformly strong presumption in the donee's favor, al-
though they have not had sufficient inter vivos decisions to settle 
the question. All three employ a contract theory of joint tenancy 
in their survivorship cases and invoke a strict parol evidence rule 
to exclude any evidence of the donor's intent outside of the writ-
ten agreement. If this theoretical approach is applied consistently 
by these courts, parol evidence should be excluded in inter vivos 
cases as well, and the donee's interests should be determined solely 
by reference to the written deposit agreement as is done in Utah 
and Pennsylvania. 
Michigan has a joint tenancy type statute,67 but interprets it 
as raising only a rebuttable presumption in survivorship as well 
as inter vivos cases. The form of the account is held to serve as 
a prima facie case for the donee in both types of cases, although 
the donor may rebut this presumption of joint tenancy by com-
petent evidence to the contrary.68 
Oregon arrives at the same result as does the Michigan court 
although under a bank protection type of statute. The donor's 
intent is said to be controlling in both types of cases, and all com-
62 Greener v. Greener, supra note 61 at 580. 
63 In re Berdar's Estate, 404- Pa. 93, 170 A.2d 861 (1961); Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 
571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949). 
64 Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W.2d 817 (1950); Connor v. 
Temm, 270 S.W.2d 54-1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954-). 
65 Bums v. Nemo, 105 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1960); Williams v. Williams, 251 Iowa 260, 
100 N.W.2d 185 (1959); Hill v. Havens, 24-2 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 870 (1951); Mcl\Ianis v. 
Keokuk Sav. Bank &: Trust Co., 239 Iowa 1105, 33 N.W.2d 410 (1948). 
66 Harvey's Estate v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784- (1955). 
67 MICH. Co~n>. LAws ANN. § 554-.43 (1948). The Michigan statute was amended in 
1937 to delete a clause providing for an irrebuttable presumption of survivorship. 
68 Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958). 
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petent evidence is admissible on this issue.69 The form of the 
account and written deposit agreement are considered to be valid 
evidence of the donor's intent, however, and once the donee has 
offered these, the burden of going forward with the evidence is 
placed upon the donor.70 
2. Uniformly Weak Presumptions for the Donee 
Eight jurisdictions give little or no weight to the form of the 
deposit, and apply the rule that outside evidence of the donor's 
intent is controlling in survivorship as well as inter vivos cases. 
Of these eight, only the District of Columbia71 and Massachusetts72 
have had sufficient inter vivos litigation to allow first-hand evalu-
ation of their rules. The remaining six jurisdictions, Arkansas, 
Idaho, Kansas, South Dakota, Texas and Virginia, fall under this 
heading by necessary implication from the weak presumptions 
they employ in survivorship cases,73 since it may be assumed that 
no court would employ a stronger presumption in inter vivos cases 
than is employed in survivorship actions. Thus, in none of these 
jurisdictions can the joint account be categorized as a "Poor 
Man's Will"; it cannot be relied upon with any certainty to pass 
a survivorship interest to the donee at the donor's death. Regard-
less of the form of the account, the donee's interest may be con-
tested, and the question of intent will be for the jury to determine 
from the evidence as a whole. Furthermore, according to the tra-
ditional common-law concept of the single but composite nature 
of the joint tenancy interest, the donor must have intended to 
give both parts of this property interest to the donee before either 
aspect of the joint tenancy may be given effect. The donee will 
oo State v. Gralewski's Estate, 176 Ore. 448, 159 P.2d 211 (1945); Beach v. Holland, 
172 Ore. 396, 142 P.2d 990 (1943); In re Edward's Estate, 140 Ore. 431, 14 P.2d 276 (1932). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Imirie v. Imirie, 246 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F.2d 194 
(D.C. Cir. 1952). 
72 Campagna v. Campagna, 337 Mass. 599, 150 N.E.2d 699 (1958); Gaucher v. Planeta, 
338 Mass. 121, 153 N.E.2d 895 (1958); Ball v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 N.E.2d 898 (1943). 
73 Von Tungeln v. Chapman, 343 S.W.2d 782 (Ark. 1961); Park v. McC!emens, 231 
Ark. 983, 334 S.W .2d 709 (1960); Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650 (1956); In re 
Chase's Estate, 82 Idaho 1, 348 P.2d 743 (1960); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'! Bank, 
81 Idaho 285, 340 P.2d 1094 (1959); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958); 
Miller v. Higgins, 188 Kan. 736, 366 P.2d 257 (1961); Spark v. Brown, 167 Kan. 159, 205 
P.2d 938 (1949); Barbour v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank, 77 S.D.106, 86 N.W.2d 526 (1957); 
Ottjes v. Littlejohn, 285 S.W .2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Adams v. Jones, 258 S.W .2d 
401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). 
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not be allowed to take the balance remaining in the account as 
survivor unless the jury finds that the donor intended to pass a 
full joint tenancy interest in the account at the time of its incep-
tion. An intent to transfer a survivorship interest alone will fail 
to give the donee any interest at all. 74 
B. Departure From Joint Tenancy Concepts 
I. Under Special Statutes 
In regard to the fourteen jurisdictions that depart from tradi-
tional joint tenancy law, six jurisdictions, Alabama, Connecticut, 
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont, have enacted 
special statutes that specifically allow the donee to take the bal-
ance remaining in the account by precluding any investigation of 
the donor's intent after the donor's death.75 Such legislative action 
successfully solves one-half of the courts' dilemma, since they 
need no longer worry about theoretical inconsistency in the two 
different types of cases. The survivorship interest is settled by the 
statute and is no longer an issue in determining the inter vivos 
interests of the parties, which question may now be decided on 
its own merits. 
The problem raised by inter vivos interests are not completely 
solved, however, since the court must still construe the essentially 
ambiguous joint account form and language. Unfortunately, the 
inter vivos decisions of these six states do not have any semblance 
of uniformity. A complete absence of decisions in Maine and Ver-
mont precludes any conclusions as to the status of the donee's inter 
vivos interests in those jurisdictions. Alabama appears to hold 
that the donee receives no inter vivos interests at all.76 Connect-
icut and New Hampshire may be presumed to give the donee a 
weak presumption at best in light of the fact that the presump-
tions accorded to survivorship cases before the statutes were en-
~ acted were weak or nonexistent. 77 
The donee's interest in New Jersey is open to more doubt. 
Prior to the enactment of the special statute in 1958, the New 
74 See Shurrum v. Watts, supra note 73; Barbour v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank, supra 
note '73. 
75 See statute cited note 32 supra. 
76 First Nat'l Bank v. Hammel, 252 Ala. 624, 42 So. 2d 459 (1949). 
77 Bachman v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 88 A.2d 391 (1952); Driscoll v. Norwich Sav. 
Soc'y, 139 Conn. 346, 93 A.2d 925 (1952); Nashua Trust Co. v. Mosgofian, 97 N.H. 17, 79 
A.2d 636 (1951). 
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Jersey courts employed a presumption in favor of the donee in 
both types of cases which placed the ultimate burden of proof of 
the donor's intent on those opposing the donee.78 This presump-
tion could be overcome by the weight of the evidence, but never-
theless did serve to give the donee an appreciable advantage in 
establishing his interest. The New Jersey statute has not been 
construed as yet and no inter vivos decisions have been handed 
down since its enactment. The possibility thus remains that the 
court will continue to invoke the same presumption in the donee's 
favor even though the survivorship question will no longer have 
any bearing on the donee's interest. It should be interesting to 
note whether the removal of the survivorship issue will cause the 
court to modify its previous holdings in regard to inter vivos 
interests, thus giving a concrete example of the influence of the 
survivorship aspects on the inter vivos cases. 
2. Under Joint Tenancy Statutes 
Of the ten jurisdictions79 that have joint tenancy type statutes, 
only four, California, Hawaii, New York and Washington can be 
said to depart from traditional joint tenancy concepts in that they 
apply dissimilar presumptions in the two types of cases. The 
other six states either apply the same presumption in both situa-
tions,80 or have not squarely faced the problem.81 
The New York Financial Code has three sections which deal 
with joint accounts, one for savings accounts and two for commer-
78 Goe v. Goe, 134 N.J. Eq. 61, 33 A.2d 870 (1943) (inter vivos); In re Perrone's 
Estate, 5 N.J. 514, 76 A.2d 518 (1950) (survivorship); Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq. 
176, 21 A.2d 743 (1941) (inter vivos); Straut v. Hollinger, 139 N.J. Eq. 206, 50 A.2d 478 
(1947) (survivorship). 
711 See statutes cited note 26 supra. 
so Missouri adheres to a strong presumption in the donee's favor in both types of 
cases through the use of the contract theory and a strict parol evidence rule. Connor v. 
Temm, 270 S.W .2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 
231 S.W.2d 817 (1950). Michigan employs a presumption in both types of cases that is 
rebuttable but serves as a prima facie case in absence of evidence to the contrary. 
Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958). The Michigan statute, MICH. 
CoMP. LAws § 554.43 (1948), was amended in 1937 to delete a clause providing for an 
irrebuttable presumption in survivorship cases. Arkansas, on the other hand, appears to 
have a uniformly weak presumption despite the joint tenancy statute. Park v. McClemens, 
231 Ark. 983, 334 S.W .2d 709 (1960); Black v. Black, 199 Ark. 609, 135 S.W .2d (1940). In 
spite of the Arkansas statute's joint tenancy language, the court regards it as merely the 
equivalent of a bank protection statute, and holds that it does not affect the rights of 
the parties as between themselves. Black v. Black, supra. 
81 Colorado, Nevada, and West Virginia have not had sufficient inter vivos litigation 
under their statute to allow for the drawing of valid conclusions. 
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cial accounts.82 The savings account section contains a clause 
making the form of the account conclusive evidence of the deposi-
tor's intent in survivorship litigation.83 This clause does not affect 
inter vivos interests, however, and under all three sections of the 
statute there is in inter vivos litigation a presumption of joint 
tenancy in the donee's favor which stands only in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary. Outside evidence of the donor's intent 
is readily admissible, and the "realities of ownership" as shown 
by parol evidence will be controlling.84 In regard to the savings 
account section of the statute, then, there is a departure from tra-
ditional joint tenancy law since the statute specifically provides 
for a conclusive presumption of the donor's intent in survivorship 
cases but is silent in regard to inter vivos questions. The other 
two sections of the statute do not contain the conclusive presump-
tion clause for survivorship cases, and the decisions under these 
sections indicate that there is merely a rebuttable presumption 
in both types of cases. 85 
The Washington statute is similar to the New York savings 
account statute in that it provides for a conclusive presumption of 
the donor's intent in survivorship litigation but does not provide 
for such a presumption in inter vivos disputes.86 The presump-
tion in inter vivos cases is held to be merely rebuttable.87 
California and Hawaii arrive at the same result as that reached 
under the New York savings account and Washington statutes, 
although they do so without benefit of a specific clause in their 
statutes making the presumption conclusive in survivorship situ-
ations.88 Both states cite and follow the landmark New York case 
of Moskowitz v. Marrow 89 even though that case was decided 
under the savings account section of the New York statute which 
included the conclusive presumption clause. The end result 1s 
82 N.Y. BANKING LAw § 239(3) (savings), §§ 134(3), 171(3) (commercial). 
83 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 239(3). 
84 Marrow v. Moskowitz, 255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460 (1931); Moskowitz v. Marrow, 
251 N.Y. 380 (1929). 
85 In re Dreschler's Estate, 282 App. Div. 4, 121 N.Y.2d 128 (1953); In re Kelly's 
Estate, 259 App. Div. 1024, 20 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1940), modified on other grounds, 285 N.Y. 
139, 33 N.E.2d 62 (1941). 
86 WASH. REV. CODE § 30.20.015 (1952). 
87 Munson v. Haye, 29 Wash. 2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948). 
88 See CAL. FIN. CODE § 852; HAWAII R.Ev. LAws § 178-91 (1955). 
89 251 N.Y. 380 (1929); Comastri v. Burke, 137 Cal. App. 2d 430, 435, 290 P.2d 663 
(1955); Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Hawaii 455 (1958); Woodward v. Auyong, 34 Hawaii 597 
(1938). 
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that these states invoke a conclusive presumption in survivorship 
cases without specific statutory authority to do so-all on the 
apparent authority of a case decided under a wholly dissimilar 
statute. As far as the presumption employed in inter vivos cases 
is concerned, however, all states with joint-tenancy type statutes 
appear to be consistent in giving to the donee a rebuttable pre-
sumption of joint tenancy which will stand in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary. 
3. By Judicial Innovation-Bank Protection Statutes 
Four states, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina and Wisconsin, 
employ a stronger presumption in survivorship cases than that 
used in inter vivos cases despite the fact that they have no statute 
which would call for this result. All four states have only a bank 
protection type of statute, which is normally regarded as not 
affecting the interests of the depositors as between themselves, but 
as merely protecting the bank from liability once it has paid 
money from the account to either of the depositors or the survivor. 
The Minnesota statute reads that the deposit "may be paid to 
either of such persons or to the survivor of them . . . ."90 The 
Minnesota court has construed this language as giving rise to a 
presumption in the donee's favor in survivorship cases.91 In the 
lone Minnesota inter vivos case, Cashman v. Mason92 (decided by 
a federal district court), however, it was held that where the donor 
withdrew the entire deposit "certainly no presumption in favor 
of the gift can arise."03 In light of the terms of the statute in which 
no differentiation is made between survivorship and inter vivos 
situations, it is difficult to see how a presumption can be said to 
arise in one situation and not in the other. The different result 
in the two types of cases is clearly a court-engendered distinction. 
It is not entirely clear whether South Carolina employs pre-
sumptions of the same strength in both types of cases. There is 
language in one South Carolina decision°4 that implies that the 
bank protection statute itself raises a presumption in survivorship 
situations that is not present in inter vivos litigation. The courts 
90 MINN. STAT. § 48.30 (1957). 
01 Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N.W. 865 (1930); 
McLeod v. Hennepin County Sav. Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N.W. 987 (1920). 
92 166 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1948). 
93 Id. at 697. 
04 Hawkins v. Thackston, 224 S.C. 445, 450•51, 79 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1954). 
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do look to outside evidence to determine the donor's intent, how-
ever, in both types of cases.95 The only conclusion that may be 
drawn, therefore, is that even though parol evidence of intent is 
admissible in both types of cases and the tests employed are similar 
in this respect, the form of the account carries more evidentiary 
weight in survivorship cases than it does in inter vivos decisions. 
Wisconsin clearly employs a presumption for the donee in 
survivorship litigation that is not present in inter vivos disputes. 
Estate of Pfeifer,96 a case in which the donor's heir contested the 
donee's right to a survivorship interest in a joint account, illus-
trates that in survivorship cases the burden of proof is placed on 
the party claiming in the name of the deceased donor, and that 
he must provide "clear and satisfactory proof that [the donor] did 
not intend the account which he created in joint form to have 
the usual incidents of such accounts."97 Zander v. Holly,98 on the 
other hand, a case in which the donee claimed a joint interest in 
the account after the donor had withdrawn all of the funds, illus-
trates that the Wisconsin court looks to all evidence of the donor's 
intent in determining the donee's inter vivos interests, and holds 
that the form of the account has little or no evidentiary value in 
this regard. In the Zander case, the testimony of both donor and 
donee was to the effect that both intended that the donee was to 
receive only a survivorship interest in the account. The lower 
court held, in light of previous survivorship decisions which stated 
that the donee received a "present interest" as a prerequisite to 
acquiring his survivorship interest, that the donee did acquire a 
present joint interest. The lower court apparently took the "pres-
ent interest" language of the prior survivorship cases at face value. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that 
the donor's intention was clearly shown to be only that of giving 
a survivorship interest to the donee, and that the donee therefore 
had no present legal right to assert against the donor. 
Wisconsin thus takes the best of both possible worlds. The 
court supports the survivorship aspect of the account by presum-
ing without proof that the donee received a present interest at 
95 Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961); Hawkins v. Thackston, 
supra note 94. 
96 1 Wis. 2d 609, 85 N.W .2d 370 (1957). 
97 Id. at 614, 85 N.W.2d at 373. 
98 1 Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d 87 (1957). 
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the inception of the account. When the donee attempts to assert 
that interest against the donor while he is alive, however, the 
court demands proof of a specific intent to pass the same "present 
interest" which was merely assumed in the survivorship situation. 
The Wisconsin court has clearly chosen to give certainty to the 
survivorship aspect of the joint account without sacrificing its 
ability to decide the related inter vivos issue on the particular 
merits of each individual case. 
In Ohio, recent developments have opened the door to a new 
possible solution to the joint account problem. Prior to 1959, the 
Ohio courts adhered to a contract theory whereby the donee was 
said to acquire a "present interest"911 in the account by means of 
the deposit contract, and the Ohio cases continually reiterated 
the idea that it was this "present interest" that allowed the sur-
vivorship feature of the account to be effective in the face of the 
statute of wills.100 In all of these cases, the "present interest," al-
though not precisely defined, appeared to be a traditional joint 
tenancy type of interest with its dual aspects of inter vivos owner-
ship and survivorship.101 Alongside this basic theory, however, 
the Ohio courts also held that the donor retained an unalterable 
right to revoke the donee's interests by merely withdrawing all of 
the funds from the account or cancelling the account and placing 
the funds in his name alone.102 The donee's survivorship interest 
under this scheme was thus conditioned upon the donor's leaving 
funds in the account at the time of his death; his inter vivos inter-
ests were seemingly nonexistent, since he had no legal right to 
assert against the donor if the latter were to revoke the account. 
It would seem that the only way the donee could possibly assert 
an inter vivos right to the funds would be for him to withdraw 
funds from the account before the donor had revoked. This aspect 
of the Ohio law raises doubts both as to the validity of the court's 
characterization of the donee's interest as a "joint interest," and as 
llll Cleveland Trust v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926); Keyt v. Mitchell, 
106 Ohio App. 149, 153 N.E.2d 690 (1957); Schwartz v. Sandusky County Sav. &: Loan, 
65 Ohio App. 437, 30 N.E.2d 556 (1939). 
100 See cases cited note 99 supra. 
101 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 248, 151 N.E. 373, 377 (1926) ("a 
joint interest in the deposit, equal to his own'); Keyt v. Mitchell, 106 Ohio App. 149, 
153, 153 N.E.2d 690, 695 (1957) ("a joint and survivorship account"); Schwartz v. San-
dusky County Sav. &: Loan, 65 Ohio App. 437, 441, 30 N.E.2d 556, 558 ("a present joint 
interest'). 
102 E.g., Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, supra note 101 at 247, 151 N.E. at 377. 
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to just what interests the donee did acquire in the account under 
the guise of "present interests." If the donee did obtain a joint in-
terest at the time of the account's inception, the interest was some-
thing new to the common law of joint ownership if the donor 
could thereafter revoke it at will. 
Into this state of the law entered the 1959 Ohio appellate court 
case of In re Estate of Voegeli,1°3 a survivorship case in which the 
donor's administrator challenged the donee's right to take the 
funds remaining in the account at the donor's death. The court 
upheld the donee's survivorship interest, but in doing so came up 
with a wholly new theory of joint accounts. The court stated that 
"ownership of the funds ... passes to the survivor by virtue of 
the contract. . . . The funds do not pass as an incident to joint 
tenancy (not recognized in Ohio) ... , or necessarily upon the prin-
ciple of survivorship."104 The court thus used the contract theory 
not as a means of creating a joint interest in the donee, but rather 
as giving rise to a purely contractual claim against the bank under 
a third-party beneficiary contract. According to the Voegeli deci-
sion, the donee received a "then vested survivorship interest"105 in 
the account at the time of its inception. 
Such a theory places the joint account transaction in an entirely 
new light. The donee's "present interest" no longer is thought of in 
terms of a property interest in the account, but becomes a purely 
contractual right which is to take effect at a future date and is con-
ditioned upon the presence of funds in the account at the donor's 
death. By definition, the donee can have no other inter vivos 
rights of ownership in the account against the donor, since the 
donee's only interest, his "present interest," is a presently vested 
survivorship interest having no enforceability until the donor dies. 
This characterization of the donee's interest as a presently existing 
contract right conditioned upon the occasion of the donor's death 
is not without precedent in other areas of the law. Contracts in 
which performance by one party is to be the payment of money by 
his estate after his death have been upheld as not in conflict 
with the statute of wills.106 
103 108 Ohio App. 371, 161 N.E.2d 778 (1959). 
104 Id. at 377, 161 N.E.2d at 783. 
105 Id. at 380, 161 N.E.2d at 785. 
100 See In re Howe's Estate, 31 Cal. 2d 395, 189 P .2d 5 (1948); GaNun v. Palmer, 216 
N.Y. 603, Ill N.E. 223 (1916) (Cardozo, J.); ATKINSON, WILLS 194 (2d ed. 1953). But see 
The American Univ. v. Conover, ll5 N.J.L. 468, 180 Atl. 830 (1935). 
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The revocable nature of the donor's obligation, however, is in-
consistent with the Voegeli contract right theory as well as with the 
joint ownership theory of the joint account transaction. Normally, 
when the conditions precedent to one party's performance are 
wholly within that party's control the contract will be invalidated 
as illusory.107 It can hardly be said that the donee's contractual 
survivorship interest in the account is anything but illusory if the 
donor can revoke it at will by merely withdrawing the funds. The 
only explanation that may be given for this revocability aspect of 
the joint account therefore is that the Ohio courts have chosen to 
recognize the joint account as a new way of transferring funds at 
death without the necessity of the formalities required by the 
statute of wills.108 The revocability feature of the account is a 
direct borrowing from the law of wills which allows the testator to 
amend or revoke the disposition he has made of his property by 
will up to the time of his death. 
The most important problem that arises in connection with 
the Voegeli theory, however, is its close similarity to the "payable 
at death" type of bank account which we have seen has uniformly 
been held to be invalid to pass a survivorship interest to the donee. 
If the donee's "present interest" under the Voegeli theory is merely 
a contract right for future enjoyment, the "payable at death" type 
of account should be equally capable of passing the same contrac-
tual interest to the donee. This is particularly true in light of the 
third-party beneficiary analysis which the court applied in the 
Voegeli case. It would seem that once the joint ownership issue is 
removed from the analysis of the transaction, as is done by the 
Voegeli court, the donee's present interest would be exactly the 
same in both types of accounts. It is quite doubtful whether such 
a "present interest," stripped of its aura of joint tenancy, would 
be upheld by the majority of courts in the United States when 
challenged as a testamentary disposition not made in accordance 
to the statute of wills. 
III. NATURE OF THE DoNEE's INTEREST 
Once a court decides that the donee does have inter vivos 
interests in the account, the question still remains of defining 
107 See l CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 16 (1950). 
10s See Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 376 (1959). 
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just exactly what these interests are. There is no clear cut answer 
to this question. A state-to-state study of the case law indicates 
that the results reached cannot be attributed to the statutes or 
theories employed. 
Jurisdictions with joint tenancy statutes are an exception to 
this generalization since these jurisdictions will quite naturally 
hold that the donee takes a joint tenancy interest. This goes far in 
settling the survivorship disputes in these jurisdictions, but does 
not illuminate the situation to any great degree in regard to the 
nature of the inter vivas interests. The joint tenancy created is 
not a common-law joint tenancy since the common-law require-
ments have not been fulfilled,109 and the resulting characteristics 
of a statutory joint tenancy will therefore not necessarily be 
determined by common-law considerations. 
The majority of courts in bank protection statute jurisdictions, 
as well as those in all the joint tenancy statute states, hold that the 
donor and donee have some type of joint mvnership. In most states 
such a finding is used as a basis for upholding the donee's survivor-
ship interest, and the exact meaning in an inter vivas context has 
not been litigated. In the states in which the question has arisen, 
the main problem has been determining the effect of a withdrawal 
of part or all of the funds from the account. Some cases hold that 
withdrawal is an invitation to sever the joint tenancy or is an actual 
severance in itself.11° The donor and donee thereby become tenants 
in common and are each entitled to one-half of the funds in the 
account.m Other cases hold that the withdrawal does not cause a 
severance but that the joint tenancy remains in effect despite the 
withdrawal and "follows" the withdrawn funds.112 Under the 
latter doctrine the donor and donee retain their right of survivor-
ship in the funds and can trace them into property purchased by 
the withdrawer, whereas if the joint tenancy is held to be severed 
109 See BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 185 (2d ed. 1953). 
110 Goe v. Goe, 134 N.J. Eq. 61, 33 A.2d 870 (1943); Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J. 
Eq. 176, 21 A.2d 743 (1941); Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 Atl. 172 (1934) 
(tenancy by the entireties); Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955); Austin v. 
Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961). 
111 Goe v. Goe, supra note 110; Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, supra note 110; Rapisardi v. 
Rapisardi, 99 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Sitomer v. North River Sav. Bank, 194 Misc. 
870, 95 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949) (creditor case). 
112 American Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 131 Cal. App. 2d 382, 280 P.2d 545 (1955); 
Daniels v. Harney, 111 Cal. App. 2d 400, 244 P.2d 773 (1952); Armbruster v. Armbruster, 
326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W .2d 28 (1930); In re Dreschler's Estate, 282 App. Div. 4, 121 N.Y.S.2d 
128 (1953); State v. Gralewski's Estate, 176 Ore. 448, 159 P.2d 211 (1945). 
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by withdrawal, the right of survivorship perishes when the joint 
tenancy is converted into a tenancy in common. 
There is a sprinkling of decisions113 that hold that both the 
donee and the donor have an unqualified right to the entire 
amount of money in the account. Whichever one withdraws the 
money first gets full title to it and cannot be held liable for any 
portion by the other party.114 
Courts which conscientiously apply the contract theory to the 
joint account may uphold as the donee's inter vivas interest what-
ever is stated in the deposit agreement.115 In the absence of lan-
guage in the agreement other than that the parties shall hold as 
joint tenants with right of survivorship, the same problems will 
be faced in these jurisdictions as are faced by the courts that hold 
that the parties hold as joint tenants as a matter of law. 
As noted previously, the Ohio case of In re Estate of Voegeli116 
holds that the parties do not hold as joint tenants but that the 
donee merely acquires a presently vested contract right to receive 
the balance of the funds when the donor dies. Such a holding is 
tantamount to a decision that the donee has no inter vivas interest 
at all if we define "inter vivas interest" as meaning an interest 
which the donee can assert against the donor during the donor's 
lifetime. 
IV. SUMMARY 
The great majority of problems that have arisen in the context 
of joint accounts have not been resolved with clarity or under-
standing because of the fact that almost all courts, in the absence 
of statute, insist upon analyzing the transaction along traditional 
joint ownership lines. A single workable theory for both survivor-
ship and inter vivos aspects of the account cannot be reached 
under this traditional analysis because under this approach the 
two interests are not regarded as separate and distinct, but are 
considered to be necessary attributes of the overall joint ownership. 
Thus, a court cannot, with consistency, separate the two features 
113 Kranjcec v. Belinak, 114 Mont. 26, 132 P.2d 150 (1942); Ludwig v. Montana 
, Bank &: Trust Co., 109 Mont. 477, 98 P.2d 377 (1939) (dictum); In re Whiteside's Estate, 
159 Neb. 362, 67 N.W.2d 141 (1954) (when co-depositor has knowledge of the withdrawal). 
114 See cases cited note 113 supra. 
115 See Harvey's Estate v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955); Hill v. 
Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W .2d 870 (1951); McManis v. Keokuk Sav. Bank &: Trust Co., 
239 Iowa 1105, 33 N.W.2d 410 (1948); Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 
N.W.2d 194 (1951) (creditor case); Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W .2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954). 
116 108 Ohio App. 371, 161 N.E.2d 778 (1959). 
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and give effect to the survivorship aspect of the account on a joint 
ownership rationale and still be free to determine the inter vivos 
controversies on a different theory. This is so despite the fact that 
in reality a particular donor may not intend to pass to his donee 
both the elements of joint ownership necessary under the tradi-
tional concepts. 
The joint ownership analysis is thus simply incapable of 
solving the problems that arise in inter vivos settings and simul-
taneously giving to the donor any assurance that the funds will 
pass to the donee at his death. If a court does employ the tradi-
tional analysis, it must deal consistently with the survivorship and 
inter vivos aspects of the account. 
In an attempt to solve this dilemma by allowing the survivor-
ship aspect to be effective without giving increased status to the 
inter vivos aspect of the account, some states have enacted statutes 
guaranteeing the survivorship feature of the account (special 
statutes). Others have enacted statutes in which it is less than 
clear whether or not the survivorship aspect is intended to receive 
preferential treatment (joint tenancy statutes). In the absence of 
statute, however, relatively few jurisdictions have seen fit to 
follow Professor Kepner's advice and depart from joint owner-
ship law by allowing the joint account to guarantee survivorship 
without similarly guaranteeing inter vivos interests to the donee.117 
Despite the fact that the joint ownership analysis is clumsy and 
ill-suited to the problems that arise, the great majority of courts 
feel bound to adhere to it as the only available legal prop to sup-
port the survivorship feature. These courts feel that they cannot 
take just one aspect of the joint ownership principle and simply 
forget about the other. They also feel that if the survivorship 
feature of the account is to be allowed at all it must be done in a 
manner consistent with established legal principles. The question 
that is ultimately presented is whether a court should itself bring 
about a change in the law in order to effectuate what it may con-
sider to be a particular need of society. As long as most courts con-
tinue to answer that question in the negative, and in the absence 
of specific statutory change, the problem of determining whether 
or not the donee has inter vivos interests in a joint bank account 
will remain incapable of conclusive determination. 
David K. Kroll, S.Ed. 
117 See text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra. 
